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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Appellants originally brought this Appeal before the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section 78-2-2(3)(i), as the Judgment appealed from is one over
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction.

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme

Court, this appeal was transferred to this Court for disposition
on July 8, 1987.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
This is an Appeal from a Judgment entered on April 1,
1987, by the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
following a bench trial before the Honorable David B. Dee,
District Court Judge, on January 6-8, 1985.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Utah Code Annotated, 22-1-1 et. seq.

2.

Utah Code Annotated, 57-1-13.

3.

Utah Code Annotated, 25-5-1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
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The Respondents Davis and Casper did not file Counterclaims against the Appellants as was represented in the course
of proceedings in Appellant's Brief.

These said parties, during

the proceedings, did not file any Counterclaims or Cross-Claims.
C.

DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
Following a bench trial, the Trial Court issued a

Memorandum Decision (a copy of which is included as "Exhibit A"
in the Addendum to Appellants' Brief).

Thereafter, Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law were issued

("Exhibit B" in the

Addendum of Appellants' Brief), and Judgment was entered dismissing all nine causes of action in Appellants' Complaint.
Respondents Davis and Casper did not file any Counterclaim or
Cross-Claim.
D.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellants had tried, on their own without success, to
sell their home for approximately two months (T. Vol.1 P.9)
before listing with Casper and Company for six months
Exhibit 20 and T. Vol. I p. 76).

(see

After the expiration of the

first Listing Agreement a new Listing Agreement was entered into
for an additional three month period as per Exhibit 1.

The home

did sell and culminated in a closing that took place on May 23,
1980 (T. Vol. I p. 9) at which time the Listing Agreement, by its
own terms, terminated.
During the time the Respondents Casper and Davis had
listings with the Appellants there were open houses, paper ads,
and the property was listed with the Multiple Listing Service
2

(T. Vol. I P.11).

Appellant Theodore B. Salazar testified that

he was not dissatisfied with the efforts made to sell his home
(T. Vol. I p. 79) , and that after the closing there was no
other written document entered

into with the realtors, the

Respondents Casper and Davis (T. Vol. I p. 79 and T. Vol. I p.
100), and no further money was ever paid to said Respondents by
Appellants.
One of the problems in selling the home was that the
first mortgage holder, Prudential Federal Savings, had a due on
sale clause which required that the home be refinanced if a sale
was discovered

(see Exhibit 25 and T. Vol. I p. 115-116).

Although the FHA Appraisal for the home was $56,350.00 (Exhibit
26 T. Vol. I p. 117), the home did sell for Appellants' asking
price of $59,900.00

(T. Vol. II p. 11), and pursuant to the

Uniform Real Estate Contract, the balance owed by Respondents
Edwards was to be paid on or before June 1, 1981, through
refinancing the property or assuming the existing loan (T. Vol.
II p. 12).
Subsequent to the closing, Respondents Edwards mailed,
directly to the Salazars, the money for the mortgage payments
and, apparently, Appellants then mailed a payment on to Prudential Federal Savings.

The Respondents Casper and Davis had no

further contact with Appellants after the closing until the
spring of 1981, when, in about the middle of March of 1981, Mr.
Edwards had accepted new employment in Idaho and had decided to
move back to Idaho he contacted Mr. Davis to put the home back
3

on the market (T. Vol. II p. 14-15).

When a Listing Agreement

was obtained from the Edwards, Mr. Davis, as agent for Edwards,
informed the Appellants by calling them and telling them that the
Edwards had put the home on the market and were attempting to
sell it (T. Vol. II p. 140-141).
The Appellants tried to borrow $10,000.00 against the
home after the sale to try to get some of their remaining
equity out of the home, but could not because they resided out
of state (T. Vol. I p. 81 and p. 102).
The Respondent Davis suggested to the Appellants that
perhaps the Respondent Edwards would be able to borrow $10,000.00
against the property and give the money to Appellants if the
Edwards could be given more time to sell the property (T. Vol.
II p. 141-142 and T. Vol. Ill p. 26).

Subsequently, at Mr.

Salazar's request, a meeting was held in Utah at the home of one
of his relatives.

In order for the Edwards to borrow against

the property, Appellants needed to give Edwards a Warranty Deed
to the property (T. Vol. II p. 142), and two ways were suggested
to protect the balance of Appellants' equity:

(1)

A Trust Deed

and Trust Deed Note; and (2) A Deed signed by the Edwards to be
kept in the file and recorded at a later time if things didn't
work out.

After explaining the time period involved with a Trust

Deed, the Appellant Mr. Salazar decided he wanted the Edwards to
sign a Quit Claim Deed back to Appellants (T. Vol. II p. 148).
Respondent Davis helped to arrange the second mortgage, and at
the Appellants' request, the $10,000.00 they wanted out of the
4

property was wired directly to their Las Vegas bank account (T.
Vol. I p. 36), because it was safer and faster than mailing a
check (T. Vol. I p. 82). The Appellants were fully advised that
the $10,000.00 they wanted and couldn't get on their own was
coming from a second mortgage to be placed on the home through
Edwards (T. Vol. Ill p. 35-37).
After the Appellants received the $10,000.00 on June
12, 1981, the Edwards continued to make mortgage payments to
Appellants for the first mortgage since it was in their name and
paid the second mortgage payments through September of 1981.
Continuing efforts to sell the home resulted

in a contract

between the Respondents Edwards and Barkers for the sale of the
home.

Respondent Davis fully advised Appellants regarding the

terms of the Edwards-Barker transaction and how the payments
would be made (T. Vol. Ill p. 39), and Appellant Mr. Salazar
approved of the transaction (T. Vol. Ill p. 39-40 & 42). After
the Edwards-Barker transaction was finalized Mr. Salazar instructed Respondent Davis to record the Edwards' Quit Claim Deed
(T. Vol. I p. 102-103).

Mr. Salazar, during his deposition and

also at the trial under cross examination, testified that he
understood

that by recording the Quit Claim Deed from the

Edwards that that terminated the Uniform Real Estate Contract
between Appellants and Respondent Edwards (T. Vol. I p. 104-105).
From October, 1981 through August of 1983, the Appellants received and accepted $200.00 per month payments from
Barkers through Beehive Properties Trust account marked "Contract
5

Sale Payment", "interest payment"f or "equity" and/or "contract
payment" (see Exhibit 21 and T. Vol. I p. 105-108), and endorsed
and deposited these checks in their bank account (T. Vol. I p.
108).

The payments on the first and second mortgage were also

paid the same way through this period of time.
Appellant Mr. Salazar, at the trial, claimed that he
did not know of the existence of the second mortgage on the
property until approximately six months after the Edwards-Barker
transaction, but he continued to accept checks for another 16
months after supposedly making this discovery.

Respondent Davis

testified that Mr. Salazar knew about it before the $10,000.00
was wired to Appellants (T. Vol. Ill p. 51).
Respondent Barkers started processing a V.A. loan in
the early part of 1983, and the loan had been approved and the
Barkers were waiting for the points to drop.

Appellants could

have avoided all of their alleged damages by being more patient
and waiting for Barkers to close, but instead chose, through
intimidation tactics, to force Barkers to leave the property.
Barkers quit claimed to Salazars and Salazars

subsequently

resold the property for a higher price of $63,000.00.
Approximately two weeks before the Barkers moved out
of the home, Mrs. Salazar talked with Mr. Barker and was advised
that

the Barkers had qualified

and that the loan would go

through just as soon as the points came down (T. Vol. Ill p.
105).

Mrs. Barker also talked with Mrs. Salazar, and was told

that she (Mrs. Salazar) "didn't understand her husband ct
6

that

point, that he was very mad, very upset, and that he wanted
somebody to pay" (T. Vol. Ill P. 105).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Uniform Real Estate Contract between Appellants

and Respondents Edwards was terminated by the Appellants ordering
the filing of a Quit Claim Deed from Edwards back to them.
2.

The unsigned crossed out Trust Deed Note of May

20, 1981, was indefinite as to its validity and meaning and a
dispute existed as to what, if anything, it represents, and the
Trial Court correctly ordered that it was unenforceable.

If, as

Appellants argue, this was a modification of the Uniform Real
Estate Contract between Appellants

and Edwards, then

this

modification would also have terminated when the Quit Claim Deed
from Edwards back to Appellants was filed.
3.

The Appellants did not prove any decrease in the

value of the property as was alleged in their waste claims and
the minimal amount for repairs that Appellants are now seeking
was greatly disputed as to whether it was prior to Edwards1
possession, normal wear and tear, after Appellants took the
property back, or the result of vandals.

If, in fact, the waste

damages complained of did occur during the possession of Edwards
or Barkers, the expense to the Appellants would
avoided

have been

if Appellants would have allowed Barkers to finish

buying the property.
4.

Appellants' claims of fraud were properly dis-

missed.
7

5.

All of the breach of fiduciary claims pled by the

Appellants against Respondents Davis and Casper were based on
the Listing Agreement that terminated on May 23, 1980, and
Appellants1 efforts to resurrect and add to the Listing Agreement
for alleged breaches of fiduciary duties in May and June of 1981
were properly dismissed by the Trial Court.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COORT CORRECTLY RULED IN
DISMISSING ALL OP APPELLANTS' CLAIMS
In order to overturn the ruling of the Trial Court,
this Court must find that there was no basis in fact for the
Trial Court's ruling.

We must look at the facts in the light

most favorable to the Defendants.

The fact that on most issues

there was conflicting testimony, and the fact that the Appellants, in their Brief, have attempted to present the facts in
the light most favorable to their position, is not a proper
basis to overturn the Trial Court's ruling.

The Trial Court was

in the best position to judge the truth and veracity of the
witnesses.
The Respondents Davis and Casper will only briefly
respond to those issues in which they are not directly involved:
1.

APPELLANTS' CLAIM OF BREACH OF CONTRACT BY RE-

SPONDENT EDWARDS.
The Trial Court ruled that the Appellants waived their
right to insist upon full performance as originally contemplated
on June 1, 1981, and for the payment of the amount of $28,175.00
and cited The Restatement of Contracts First Sections 297, 298,
8

299 and Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended Title 57-1-6 through
13 (Memorandum Decision hereinafter cited as M.D. p.3-4).

The

Trial Courtf in making its decision on this issue, correctly
noted the conveyance of a Warranty Deed by the Appellants to
Edwards, the borrowing of $11,000.00 against the property,
$10,000.00 of which was paid to and accepted by the Appellants,
and the continued payment of the first and second mortgages by
Edwards until September, 1981, and the recording of a Quit Claim
Deed in October of 1981, which terminated the Salazar-Edwards
contract (M.D. p.3).
As noted in these Respondents1 Statement of Facts, the
Appellant Mr. Salazar instructed the recording of the Edwards'
Quit Claim Deed (T. Vol. I p. 102-103), and at the time he gave
these instructions he understood that by the recording of the
Quit Claim Deed it would terminate the Uniform Real Estate
Contract between the Appellants and Respondent Edwards (T. Vol. I
p. 104-105).
2.

APPELLANTS' CLAIM FOR ALLEGED BREACH OP UNSIGNED

PROMISSORY NOTE.
The Trial Court ruled that the facts clearly indicate
that the Note was never signed and there existed a dispute as to
what the Note represents, and because of its undefinitiveness and
because it was unsigned, it is barred by the Statute of Frauds
and unenforceable, and cited Utah Code Annotated 25-5-1 through 3
(M.D. p.4).
Exhibit

6, which

is the alleged Note, is marked
9

unsigned copy and had a line crossing out Trust Deed Note and
the words "Extension Agreement" were written in.

Respondent

Davis, who prepared this document, testified that the document
was one of two options that he explained to the Salazars and
that Appellant Mr. Salazarf instead of going for the Trust Deed
and Trust Deed Note, decided he wanted the Edwards to sign a
Quit Claim Deed

(T. Vol. II p. 148) f and that the original

document was never given to the Edwards to sign because the
parties did not go this direction (T. Vol. Ill p. 65). Mr. Davis
testified that the crossing out of "Trust Deed Note" was done to
indicate that it was no longer valid and that another alternative
had been chosen (T. Vol III p. 96).
3.

APPELLANTS' CLAIM THAT THEY ACCEPTED THE WRITTEN

PROMISE OP MAY 20, 1981 (THE TRUST DEED PROMISSORY NOTE, AGAIN
EXHIBIT 6) AND BASED THEREON DELIVERED THE WARRANTY DEED TO
RESPONDENT EDWARDS.
The Trial Court ruled that this claim was another claim
for relief for breach of contract, and that the Statute of Frauds
would require that the Agreement by in writing and signed.

The

Trial Court further ruled that the Court could not in equity
construct an Agreement when there is not sufficient proof as to
what the alleged Agreement represents and that the Appellants had
not sustained the burden of establishing what the Agreement
represents (M.D. p. 4 ) .
The Appellants' Complaint alleged that, supposedly,
the Edwards were to pay $10,000.00 down and that the Warranty
10

Deed was for the purpose of getting another loan in the amount
of $18,175.00 to fully pay off the balance owed.
At the trial, Appellant Mr. Salazar testified that the
Appellants had tried to borrow $10,000.00 against the home on
their own and could not because they resided out of state (T.
Vol. I p. 81 & 102).

Respondent Davis testified

that the

Edwards were willing to borrow the $10,000.00 and give it to the
Appellants in exchange for more time to sell the home (T. Vol.
II p. 141-142 & T. Vol. Ill p. 26). Appellants fully understood
and were advised that the $10,000.00 they received was from a
second mortgage on the home through Edwards for the $10,000.00
they couldn't get on their own (T. Vol. Ill p. 35-37).
If the Warranty Deed was solely for the purpose of
borrowing another $18,175.00, as the Appellants argued, then
there would have been no need for a Trust Deed and Trust Deed
Note or for the Quit Claim Deed chosen by the Appellants.
4.

CLAIM FOR WASTE AGAINST RESPONDENTS EDWARDS.

The Trial Court ruled that the Appellants failed to
prove their alleged repair costs and were not able to sustain the
burden of showing that there was exclusive possession by Respondents Edwards-Barkers and failed to show the alleged waste
caused any decrease in the value of the property (M.D. p. 4 ) .
Appellants alleged in their Complaint that the waste
was committed during the period of June 1, 1980 and October 7,
1981, that it caused a $10,000.00 loss in the value of the
property, and that under Utah Code Annotated, 78-38-2, 1953 as
11

amended, they were entitled to treble damages of $30,000.00.
The house resold at a later time, after the Barkers
quit claimed their interest to the Appellants for $63,000.00; it
had originally been sold to the Edwards for $59,900.00.
The Respondent Mr. Edwards testified that many of the
problems existed at the time they took possession in June of
1980.

There was mention of vandals.

The Appellants did not see

the property for 3 1/2 years after they sold it to the Edwards.
The minimal amount spent by the Appellants of $1,438.76, most of
which was for labor, could easily be attributable to normal wear
and tear for the period of time involved.
5.

CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION AGAINST

RESPONDENTS EDWARDS.
Appellants alleged in their First Cause of Action that
allegedly the Edwards, when they entered into the Uniform Real
Estate Contract with the Appellants, misrepresented that the
Appellants would be paid the balance of their $28,175.00 remaining equity on or before June 1, 1981, and that as a result of
the said alleged misrepresentation the Appellants

suffered

damages of not less than $50,000.00 and said Respondents should
be punished by the imposition of punitive dcunages of $50,000.00.
The Trial Court found that the Appellants waived the
payment of $28,175.00 due on June 1, 1981 for the same reasons
already indicated by the Trial Court regarding Appellants' First
Cause of Action (M.D. p. 4). See argument and facts concerning
the Appellants1 First Cause of Action in 1 above.
12

The Trial

Court noted that to allow the Appellants to retain Edwards1 real
property rights by the filing of the Quit Claim Deed and then to
allow the Plaintiffs to collect $28,175.00 would be clear unjust
enrichment to the Appellants.

As noted in 1 above, the Appellant

Mr. Salazar requested the recording of the Edwards' Quit Claim
Deed and he knew at the time of making this request that by so
doing the Uniform Real Estate Contract with the Edwards terminated.
6.

CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION AGAINST

EDWARDS REGARDING THE WARRANTY DEED, THE $10r000.00 THAT WAS
PAID TO APPELLANTS, HOW THE BALANCE OF $18,175.00 WAS TO BE PAID
TO APPELLANTS.
The Trial Court denied this claim on the grounds that
it did not have any merit (M.D. p. 4).
Basically the Appellants alleged as they did in their
Second and Third Causes of Action that the Warranty Deed was
given for a loan of $18,175.00 and that the Edwards were supposedly to pay $10,000.00 of their own money instead of giving
the Warranty Deed to Edwards to borrow the $10,000.00 that the
Appellants could not qualify for because they resided out of
state.

See numbers 1, 2, and 3 above.
Obviously the Trial Court did not believe the Appel-

lants.

There was no need for either a Trust Deed Promissory

Note and Trust Deed or the Quit Claim Deed if the Edwards were
supposed to use their own $10,000.00 and then use the Warranty
Deed for a $18,175.00 loan.

If indeed this was the plan, the
13

Appellants would have been fully paid off and these documents
would not have been necessary to protect the balance after the
$10,000.00.

Further, this alleged type of arrangement would not

have solved the due on payment clause problem with the first
mortgage holder (T. Vol. I p. 115-116 & Exhibit 25).
7.

APPELLANTS' CLAIM FOR WASTE AGAINST RESPONDENT

BARKERS.
The Trial Court denied this Cause of Action (Appellants1 Ninth) for the same reasons it denied the waste claims
against Respondents Edwards.

See facts and argument under 4

above.
Again, the Appellant pled that the market value had
diminished $10,000.00 and asked for treble damages in the sum of
$30,000.00.

The home sold for more than it had originally been

sold for.

Absolutely no testimony of a decrease in value was

offered.

Appellants did not plead repair costs in either of

their waste claims and the items that were represented as having
been damaged were hotly contested as to who and when and as to
whether the damage was before possession by Edwards or after
Barkers left, and whether it was normal wear and tear.
The evidence offered by Appellants had nothing to do
with the waste claims as they plead them in their Complaint.
II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED APPELLANTS
CLAIM OF ALLEGED BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BY
RESPONDENTS CASPER AND DAVIS
The Trial Court ruled that the claims made by Appel14

lants of breach of fiduciary duty was not supportable by the
evidence and testimony or the analysis of law.
specifically

noted

that

The Trial Court

these Respondents fulfilled their

obligation under the Sales Agency Agreementf Exhibit 1, and that
after there was no fiduciary duty owed by them to Appellants as
per Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 22-1-1 et seq. (M.D.
p.6).
Appellants' seventh claim in their Complaint claims
that pursuant to a Sales Agency Agreement, Exhibit 1, that
implicit in said Agreement these Respondents owed Appellants a
fiduciary duty of trust, loyalty, honesty, and confidence in
arranging for the sale of the Appellants' property.

Despite the

fact that said Sales Agency Agreement terminated by its own
terms on May 23, 1980, when the sale to the Edwards closed, the
Appellants claim that on or about May 20, 1981, that somehow
Respondent Davis was still "their sales agent" and that he
breached his fiduciary duty to them by: (a) working with Edwards
to borrow the $10,000.00 that was given to the Appellants, (see
Argument I, parts 1,2,3,5 and 6 above); (b) that he allegedly
represented to Appellants that he would find other buyers for
the property at a price and according to terms agreeable to
Plaintiff

(although at the time there was no Listing Agreement

between the parties); (c) that on or about October 1, 1982, he
allowed the Respondent Barkers to take possession of the property
without any consent or authorization from Appellants; (d) that
he failed and refused to remove the Barkers from the property.
15

Appellants claimed they suffered damages of $10,000.00 and Davis
and Casper should be punished with punitive damages of $25,000.00
(See Plaintiff's Complaint, seventh claim.)
1.

THE SALES AGENCY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THESE PARTIES

HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY TERMINATED.
Exhibit 1 is the Listing Agreement, the Respondents
Casper and Davis did find an acceptable buyer, the Edwards, for
the Appellants.

A commission was paid at the closing on May

23, 1980, and the Listing Agreement then having been fulfilled,
terminated.

Appellant Mr. Salazar acknowledged that there were

open houses, paper ads, and that the property was listed with the
Multiple Listing Service (T Vol. I p.11).

He was not dissatis-

fied with the efforts to sell the home (T. Vol I. p. 79). After
the closing on May 23, 1980, there was no other written document
entered into with Respondents Casper and Edwards, and the Appellants (T. Vol. I p.79).

The Appellants never paid any further

money to the Respondents (T. Vol. I p. 100).

The next contact

Respondent Davis had with Appellants was after he had signed a
listing agreement with Edwards in March of 1981 to advise
Appellants as the agent for Edwards, that the home had been put
back on the market (T. Vol. II p. 140-141 & T. Vol. Ill p. 25).
The Trial Court correctly ruled that these Respondents
had fulfilled their obligation under the Sales Agency Agreement,
(M.D.

p. 6) and cited Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,

22-1-1 et seq.

As per Newell v. Halloran 68 U. 407, 250 P. 986,

many years of satisfactory business relations between parties is
16

not sufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship, and Bradley
v. Rasmussen 16 U. 2d 378, 401 P. 2d 710, the fact that Plaintiffs had confidence and trust in the Defendants was not sufficient to establish a confidential relationship.
2.

IN MAY OP 1981 f RESPONDENT DAVIS WAS HELPING

RESPONDENTS EDWARDS AS THEIR AGENT NOT AS APPELLANTS1 AGENT.
Respondent Davis had no further contact after May 23,
1980, until March of 1981, (May of 1981 according to Mr. Salazar's testimony, T. Vol. I p. 28), when he called Appellants and
told them that the home had been put back on the market by
Edwards and that he was marketing the home for Edwards (T. Vol.
II p. 140-141).

Since after May 23, 1980, there was never any

further written agreement with Appellants and Appellants never
paid any further money, it is not reasonable for the Appellants
to think that Mr. Davis was still their agent.
Appellants argue citing Pyles v. Cole, 241. S.W. 2d
841 (Tenn 1951) where Sellor continued negotiations with the
broker after the termination date, which resulted in a sale and
where the seller was the beneficiary of further efforts by the
broker which resulted in the sale, a commission was due and
owing to the broker.

Appellants argue that somehow the Sales

Agency Agreement with these Respondents and Appellants would
have been resurrected by the fact that Mr. Davis, 10 months
later, got involved as the listing agent for another party.

Our

fact situation is clearly different from the Pyles case.

The

Appellants paid a commission on May 23, 1980, the terms of
17

Exhibit 1 had been fulfilled.

The Appellants never paid or

expected to pay a further commission.

A new listing agreement

was never entered into with these Respondents and Appellants.
Any further efforts to sell the home were made pursuant to a
listing agreement with Edwards.
Appellants also alleged and argue that somehow Respondent Davis owed a fiduciary duty to them to find a new buyer at a
price and at terms agreeable to Appellants and that Davis advised
Barkers to take possession of the property without Appellants
consent or authorization.

The Trial Court ruled that these

claims were without merit because the Edwards were in legal
possession of the property and entered into a legal contract for
the sale to Barkers on October 1, 1981 (M.D. p.6).
Respondent Davis testified that he fully advised the
Appellants regarding the terms of the Edwards-Barker transaction
and that Appellant, Mr. Salazar approved of the transaction (T.
Vol. Ill P. 39-40, 42).
3.

RESPONDENT DAVIS HAD NO FIDUCIARY DOTY TO REMOVE

BARKERS.
Nothing in the Listing Agreement (Exhibit 1 ) , that was
supposedly resurrected after its fulfillment, required these
Respondents to remove anyone from the property.

These Respond-

ents were hired to sell the home; they did, and the transaction
closed on May 23, 1980.
Mr. Davis testified that he was never requested to
evict the Barkers. (T. Vol. Ill P. 50)
18

4.

APPELLANTS' NEW ARGUMENT CLAIMING A FAILURE TO

DISCLOSE THREE TRUST DEED INVESTMENTS MADE BY RESPONDENT EDWARDS
AFTER MAY 23, 1980 IS NOT A BREACH OF ANY FIDUCIARY DUTY AND WAS
NOT THE REASON EDWARDS DID NOT REFINANCE THE PROPERTY.
Appellants, in their brief, argue that somehow the
Listing Agreement, that terminated on May 23, 1980, required
Respondent Davis, in May and June of 1981, to disclose some
investments Mr. Edward made after May 23, 1980.
Respondents maintain that Exhibit 1 never required
this and even if it did it was clear that no fiduciary relationship under Exhibit 1 existed in May and June of 1981.
Regarding the facts on these investments:

Mr. Edwards

testified that he had been paid back in full on two, that he
paid Mr. Davis no commission and that he could not remember if
the two paid back in full had been paid before or after June 1,
1981 (T. Vol. II p. 42-43).

Also he received payments on the

other and eventually received an interest in the property to
protect his investment (T. Vol. Ill P. 23).

He contacted Mr.

Davis (T. Vol. II P. 15). It was possible that these notes were
due before June 1, 1981 (T Vol. Ill P. 23).

Only $2,200.00 or

$2,800.00 would have been needed for Edwards to refinance the
property (T. Vol. Ill P. 24, 100, 101).

The Edwards decided

not to refinance the property because they had decided to move
back to Idaho (T. Vol. II P. 34 & Vol. Ill P. 90, 100 and 101).
There was never any evidence to indicate that Edwards could not
have qualified for a refinancing of the home and in fact, they
19

did have credit to take the second mortgage out for the $10,000
sent to Appellants,
5.

THE LATER DATING AND NOTARIZING OF THE EDWARDS1

QUIT CLAIM DEED WAS NOT A BREACH OF ANY FIDUCIARY DUTY OWED
APPELLANTS
Respondent Edwards testified that the Quit Claim Deed
to protect Appellants' remaining equity was signed almost immediately after the second mortgage was arranged (T. Vol. II P. 35).
Respondent Davis testified that it was signed by Edwards contemporaneously with said transaction (T. Vol. II P. 148 & T. Vol.
Ill P. 31).

Davis testified that he did not normally date them

or anything until he recorded them if he needed to (T. Vol. Ill
p. 32).

It was not recorded before the Barker transaction

because Appellants had not demanded that it be recorded until
after the transaction was complete (T. Vol. Ill P. 39 & 43).
After the Barker transaction and after Appellant instructed Davis
to record it, he did arrange for the recording by giving it to
McGhie Title Company (T. Vol. Ill P. 45, 97).

Davis did what

Appellants asked him to do; how could this be a breach of
fiduciary duty?
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED ALL OF APPELLANTS1 CLAIMS FOR
FRAUD.
See Argument I, numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 above which
involve the same facts and noted conflict of testimony.

The

Trial Court correctly ruled that Appellants had not established
20

their fraud claim by a preponderance of the evidence. (M.D. p. 7)
Appellants alleged in their Complaint, eighth claim,
that the Warranty Deed given to Edwards was only for the purpose
of allowing a loan to pay the balance of $18,175.00

after

supposedly Edwards paid another $10,000.00 of their own money
instead of for the purpose of getting them the $10,000.00 of
their equity that they could not get themselves because they
resided out of state.

Appellants asked for $10,000.00 damages

and $25,000.00 punitive damages.
In Appellants1

argument, it is claimed that damages

were suffered of $2,038.79 in monthly City Consumer payments and
that they were required to pay $11,131.76 to City Consumer
Services; and that they lost $10,000 of equity in their home.
In examining these figures and the record, it is clear
that all of the City Consumer payments were paid by Edwards or
Barkers through July of 1983, and there is no evidence that
Barkers would not have continued making these payments, but for
Appellants1
Barkers.

insistence and demanding a Quit Claim Deed from

The $11,131.76 figure represents

the

$10,000.00

received by Appellants in June of 1981, and $1,131.76 closing
costs which would have been paid by Barkers at the closing of
their V.A. loan which had been approved prior to Appellants'
demands that Barkers Quit Claim the property back to them.

The

Appellants did not lose any equity; they received the $10,000.00
from the second mortgage and they later sold the home for more
than they originally sold it for.
21

What Appellants' fraud

theories represent is an effort to gain a windfall.
CONCLUSION
Appellants did not meet their burden of proof at the
trial.

The Trial Court correctly dismissed all of Appellants1

claims and a review of the record in the light most favorable to
the Respondents shows that ample evidence exists to support the
Trial Court's findings.

Further damages were not proven to

support the Appellants' various claims.

It would be patently

unjust to allow any claim allegedly incurred after Appellants
ordered Respondents Edwards and Barker to Quit Claim the property
back to Appellants.
These Respondents respectfully submit that the judgment
of the Trial Court be upheld and that they be awarded their costs
and fees incurred herein.
DATED

this

[(faf

day of February, 1988.

LEE BISH01
Attorney jfJbn Respondents
Davis and/Casper
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

Ilk

day of February,

1988, that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing,
postage prepaid to:
Michael R. Sciumbato, #2894
Joseph H. Gallegos, #1143
GALLEGOS & SCIUMBATO
333 South Denver Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants

Hal D. Barker
Myrna Barker
54 East Vine, Apt. #6
Murray, Utah 84107
Defendants-Respondents Pro Se
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Joel Edwards
LaWanna F. Edwards
5075 Galena
Chubbuck, Idaho 83202
Defendants-Respondents Pro Se
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ADDENDUM
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, Section 22-1-1 et. seq.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-1-13.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 25-5-1.
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TITLE 22
FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS
Chapter
22-1. Fiduciaries.
22-2. Trusts.
22-3. Principal and Income Act.
22-4. Prearranged funeral plans.
22-5. Fiduciary security transfers.
22-6. Retirement trusts.
CHAPTER 1
FIDUCIARIES
Section
22-1-1.
22-1-2.
22-1-3.
22-1-4.
22-1-5.
22-1-6.
22-1-7.
22-1-8.
22-1-9.
22-1-10.
22-1-11.

Definitions.
Payments made to fiduciaries.
Repealed.
Transfer of negotiable instruments by fiduciaries.
Checks — Drawn by fiduciaries, payable to third persons.
Checks drawn by or payable to fiduciary.
Bank deposits in name of fiduciary.
Checks drawn in name of principal.
Deposits in fiduciary's personal account.
Deposits in name of several trustees.
Transactions prior to May 12,1925, excepted.

22-1-U Definitions. In this chapter unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:
"Fiduciary" includes a trustee under any trust, expressed, implied,
resulting or constructive, executor, administrator, guardian, conservator,
curator, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, assignee for the benefit of creditors, partner, agent, officer of a corporation, public or private, public officer,
and any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any person, trust
or estate.
"Principal" includes any person to whom a fiduciary as such owes an
obligation.
A thing is done "in good faith" when it is in fact done honestly, whether
it is done negligently or not.
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 1; R.S. 1933 &
Jurisdictions that have adopted the UniC. 1943, 29-1-1.
form Fiduciaries Act include: Alabama, Ari. .
zona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Comparable Provisions.
I d a h o > nii no is, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland,
Utah adopted the Uniform Fiduciaries Act Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey,
effective May 12,1925, see 22-1-1 to 22-1-11.
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New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylva- at trustee's sale and paid all creditors in full
nia, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, except one, whose claim, however, was fully
discharged, did not hold patent as trustee for
Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
latter creditor. Lee v. Nelson (1926) 68 U 575,
Cross-References.
251 P 371.
Assignment for the benefit of creditors,
Elderly couple failed to establish a fiduci6-1-1 et seq.
ary relationship between themselves, on the
Business Corporation Act, 16-10-1 et seq.
one hand, and their niece and her husband,
Charitable Trust Act of 1971, 59-23-1 et on the other, where before executing a warranty deed to the niece and husband, the
seq.
elderly couple was advised extensively by
Investments generally, Title 33.
counsel on two occasions, appeared to underPartnerships generally, 48-1-1 et seq.
Personal representatives' powers and stand fully the nature of the instruments
they were signing and where they subseduties, 75-3-701 et seq.
Principal and income apportionment, quently lived in harmony with the transferees on subject property until visiting their
22-3-1 et seq.
Real Estate Investment Trust Act, 16-12-1 son. The fact that plaintiffs had confidence
and trust in the defendants was not sufficient
to 16-12-6.
Receivers, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule to establish a confidential relationship which
would give rise to a presumption of
66.
Unlawful dealing with property by fiduci- unfairness in the transaction. Bradbury v.
Rasmussen (1965) 16 U 2d 378,401 P 2d 710.
ary, 76-6-513.
Removal of trustee.
Breach of trust.
Beneficiary of testamentary trust, empowWhere employee of one of group of joint
adventurers, seeking to buy and sell certain ered by will to change trustee and whose concontiguous lands having valuable clay depos- sent is necessary to all acts of trustee
its, discovers clay on other adjoining land, relating to investment of trust fund, may
obtains option thereon, and enters into ven- remove trustee without cause and procure
ture with others upon consideration of his appointment of another, subject to qualificaoption being turned over to venturers, his tion that latter is competent and other beneemployer is not chargeable with breach of ficiaries' interests will not be jeopardized. In
trust toward other original venturers for re Lowe's Estate (1926) 28 U 49, 249 P 128.
failing to inform them of employee's discov- Collateral References.
ery until he obtained option. Lane v. PeterTrusts <3=> 7.
son (1926) 68 U 585, 251 P 374.
89 CJS Trusts § 1 et seq.
Finding that son, who had confidential
76 AmJur 2d 247, Trusts § 2.
relationship with mother, had breached fiduConstruction and application of Uniform
ciary duty in purchasing mother's property Fiduciaries
affecting rights and obligawas proper in view of, inter alia, extreme dis- tions arisingAct,
from payment of personal obliparity between market value of property and gations from trust funds, 114 ALR 1088.
purchase price. Seequist v. Seequist (1974)
Construction of specific provision of will or
524 P 2d 598.
trust instrument giving executor or trustee
Creation of relationship.
power to determine what is income or what
Many years of satisfactory business rela- is principal, 27 ALR 2d 1323.
tions between parties is not sufficient to
Existence of fiduciary relationship between
establish fiduciary relationship warranting bank and depositor or customer so as to
cancellation of lease on ground of unfair impose special duty of disclosure upon bank,
advantage taken. Newell v. Halloran (1926) 70 ALR 3d 1344.
68 U 407, 250 P 986.
Standard of care required of trustee repreAttorney who bought mining patent of senting itself to have expert knowledge or
bankrupt mining company, a former client, skill, 91 ALR 3d 904.
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
trust. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Stephens
"Express" trust defined.
The trust is an express one if it is so (1887) 5 U 319, 15 P 253, affd. 142 US 326, 35
declared by the parties in the declaration of L Ed 1029,12 S Ct 277.

22-1-2. Payments made to fiduciaries. A person, who in good faith
pays or transfers to a fiduciary any money or other property which the
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fiduciary as such is authorized to receive, is not responsible for the proper
application thereof by the fiduciary; and no right or title acquired from
the fiduciary in consideration of such payment or transfer is invalid in consequence of a misapplication by the fiduciary.
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 2; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 29-1-2.
Collateral References.
Principal and Agent <S=> 154(1).
3 CJS Agency §§ 452-457.

3 AmJur 2d 651, Agency § 291.
Right of trustee to withhold trust payments from beneficiary to obtain payment of
personal debt of latter to him, or to set off
such debt against payment to beneficiary, 8
ALR 2d 209.

22-1-3. Repealed.
Repeal.
securities held by fiduciaries, was repealed by
Section 22-1-3 (L. 1925, ch. 86, § 3; R.S. 1933 Laws 1961, ch. 46, § 12. For present provi& C. 1943, 29-1-3), relating to transfer of sions, see 22-5-1 et seq.

22-1-4. Transfer of negotiable instruments by fiduciaries. If any
negotiable instrument payable or endorsed to a fiduciary as such is
endorsed by the fiduciary, or if any negotiable instrument payable or
endorsed to his principal is endorsed by a fiduciary empowered to endorse
such instrument on behalf of his principal, the endorsee is not bound to
inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as
fiduciary in endorsing or delivering the instrument, and is not chargeable
with notice that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as
fiduciary, unless he takes the instrument with actual knowledge of such
breach or with knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith. If, however, such instrument is transferred by
the fiduciary in payment of, or as security for, a personal debt of the fiduciary to the actual knowledge of the creditor, or is transferred in any transaction known by the transferee to be for the personal benefit of the
fiduciary, the creditor or other transferee is liable to the principal, if the
fiduciary in fact commits a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in transferring the instrument.
History: L. 1925, ch. S6, § 4; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 29-1-4.
Cross-References
Uniform Commercial Code, Commercial
Paper, 70A-3-101 et seq.

Collateral References.
Bills and Notes <3=> 340.
10 C J S Bills a n d N o t e s
§ 326 , " A,mJur 2d m et • * - Bills
* 4 6 3 e t se<*-

and

Notes

22-1-5. Checks — Drawn by fiduciaries, payable to third persons.
If a check or other bill of exchange is drawn by a fiduciary as such, or
in the name of his principal by a fiduciary empowered to draw such instrument in the name of his principal, the payee is not bound to inquire
whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary
in drawing or delivering the instrument, and is not chargeable with notice
that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary,
unless he takes the instrument with actual knowledge of such breach or
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with knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument
amounts to bad faith. If, however, such instrument is payable to a personal
creditor of the fiduciary and delivered to the creditor in payment of, or
as security for, a personal debt of the fiduciary to the actual knowledge
of the creditor, or is drawn and delivered in any transaction known by the
payee to be for the personal benefit of the fiduciary, the creditor or other
payee is liable to the principal, if the fiduciary in fact commits a breach
of his obligation as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the instrument.
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 5; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 29-1-5.
n

Collateral References.
Deposit to individual account of checks or
notes drawn or endorsed by agent or fiduciary as charging bank with notice of misapplication, 106 ALR 836,115 ALR 648.

Right of bank to pay out deposit directly
to beneficiary without the order of the
trustee or fiduciary in whose name it was
m a d e > 2 ALR 1557.

22-1-6. Checks drawn by or payable to fiduciary. If a check or other
bill of exchange is drawn by a fiduciary as such, or in the name of his
principal by a fiduciary empowered to draw such instrument in the name
of his principal, payable to the fiduciary personally, or payable to a third
person and by him transferred to the fiduciary, and is thereafter transferred by the fiduciary, whether in payment of a personal debt of the fiduciary or otherwise, the transferee is not bound to inquire whether the
fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in transferring the instrument, and is not chargeable with notice that the fiduciary
is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary, unless he takes the
instrument with actual knowledge of such breach or with knowledge of
such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith.
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 6; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 29-1-6.

22-1-7. Bank deposits in name of fiduciary* If a deposit is made in
a bank to the credit of a fiduciary as such, the bank is authorized to pay
the amount of the deposit or any part thereof upon the check of the fiduciary, signed with the name in which such deposit is entered, without being
liable to the principal, unless the bank pays the check with actual knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary
in drawing the check, or with knowledge of such facts that its action in
paying the check amounts to bad faith. If, however, such a check is payable
to the drawee bank and is delivered to it in payment of, or as security
for, a personal debt of the fiduciary to it, the bank is liable to the principal,
if the fiduciary in fact commits a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in
drawing or delivering the check.
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 7; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 29-1-7.

Cross-References.
Deposit accounts, 7-1-601 et seq.
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Collateral References.
Banks and Banking <$=> 140(1).
9 CJS Banks and Banking §§ 338, 342.
76 AmJur 2d 582-587, Trusts §§ 367-373.
Right of one indebted to insolvent bank to
set off deposits which he has made as trustee,
55 ALR 822.
Trust or preference in respect of funds
deposited by executors, administrators, testamentary trustees or guardians, 37 ALR 120,
101 ALR 602.
What property may be the subject of special deposit in bank, 50 ALR 247.
Deposit by trustee of funds of separate
trusts in single bank account, 117 ALR 179.
Deposit to individual account of checks or
notes drawn or endorsed by agent or fiduciary as charging bank with notice of misappropriation, 106 ALR 836,115 ALR 648.
Following trust funds deposited in mixed
bank account of trustees, 26 ALR 3, 35 ALR
747, 55 ALR 1275,102 ALR 372.

22-1-9

Gift or trust by deposit in bank in anothr' s n a m e o r m depositor's name in trust for
another, without his knowledge, 157 ALR
925,168 ALR 1324.
Gift or trust by deposit of funds belonging
to depositor in bank account in name of nimself a n d another, 103 ALR 1123,135 ALR 993,
149 ALR 879.
Liability of executor, administrator or
trustee for interest or profits on funds deposited in a bank in which he is interested, 88
ALR 205.
Personal liability of officers or directors of
bank in respect of trust funds illegally deposited in bank, 112 ALR 1214.
Responsibility of fiduciary for loss of funds
deposited in his own name or other form not
indicating fiduciary character, 43 ALR 600.
Right of bank to pay out deposit directly
to beneficiary without the order of the
trustee or fiduciary in whose name it was
made, 2 ALR 1557.

e

22-1-8. Checks drawn in name of principal If a check is drawn upon
the account of his principal in a bank by a fiduciary who is empowered
to draw checks upon his principal's account, the bank is authorized to pay
such check without being liable to the principal, unless the bank pays the
check with actual knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of
his obligation as fiduciary in drawing such check, or with knowledge of
such facts that its action in paying the check amounts to bad faith. If,
however, such a check is payable to the drawee bank and is delivered to
it in payment of, or as security for, a personal debt of the fiduciary to it,
the bank is liable to the principal, if the fiduciary in fact commits a breach
of his obligation as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the check.
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 8; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943,29-1-8.

22-1-9. Deposits in fiduciary's personal account* If a fiduciary makes
a deposit in a bank to his personal credit of checks drawn by him upon
an account in his own name as fiduciary, or of checks payable to him as
fiduciary, or of checks drawn by him upon an account in the name of his
principal, if he is empowered to draw checks thereon, or of checks payable
to his principal and endorsed by him, if he is empowered to endorse such
checks, or if he otherwise makes a deposit of funds held by him as fiduciary, the bank receiving such deposit is not bound to inquire whether the
fiduciary is committing thereby a breach of his obligation as fiduciary; and
the bank is authorized to pay the amount of the deposit or any part thereof
upon the personal check of the fiduciary without being liable to the principal, unless the bank receives the deposit or pays the check with actual
knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as
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fiduciary in making such deposit or in drawing such check, or with knowledge of such facts that its action in receiving the deposit or paying the
check amounts to bad faith.
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, §9; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 29-1-9.
Cross-References.
Unlawful dealing with property by fiduciary, 76-6-513.

Purpose of statute.
The purpose of this statute is to protect
the bank if it allows withdrawals on the personal order of a fiduciary who may be
breaching his trust, unless the fiduciary's
breach of trust is known to the bank. Movie
Films, Inc. v. First Security Bank (1968) 22
U 2d 1,447 P 2d 38.

22-1-10. Deposits in name of several trustees. When a deposit is
made in a bank in the name of two or more persons as trustees and a
check is drawn upon the trust account by any trustee or trustees authorized by the other trustee or trustees to draw checks upon the trust
account, neither the payee nor other holder nor the bank is bound to
inquire whether it is a breach of trust to authorize such trustee or trustees
to draw checks upon the trust account, and is not liable, unless the circumstances are such that the action of the payee or other holder or the bank
amounts to bad faith.
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 10; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 29-1-10.

22-1-11. Transactions prior to May 12, 1925, excepted. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to transactions taking place prior to
May 12,1925.
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 11; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 29-1-11.

CHAPTER 2
TRUSTS
Section
22-2-1. Death of trustee — Trust estate vests in successor.

22-2-1. Death of trustee — Trust estate vests in successor. Upon the
death of a sole or surviving trustee of an express trust the trust estate
does not descend to his heirs or pass to his personal representatives, but
shall by virtue hereof, upon the appointment and qualification of a successor to such trustee, become immediately vested in such successor in trust.
History: Code Report; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 29-2-1.
Cross-References.
Death of trustee of corporation sole,
16-7-10.

Collateral References.
Trusts <3=> 168,169(1).
90 CJS Trusts §§ 236, 237.
7 6 A m J u r 2 d 373-376, Trusts §§ 132-134.
Account, duty of personal representative of
deceased trustee to render, 36 ALR 3d 1071.
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CONVEYANCES
encumbrances or defects in title, 109 A. L.
R. 242.
Signature with lead pencil, 8 A. L. R.
1339.
Statement as to use being made or intended to be made of lands excepted or
reserved from conveyance as limiting effect of exception or reservation, 139 A. L.
R. 1339.
"Surface," meaning as employed in conveyance or devise, 31 A. L. R. 1530.
Term "land" or "real property" employed in contract or conveyance as covering mineral interests constructively severed from the land, 123 A. L. R. 848.
Use or exploitation of property for a
purpose other than, but not exclusive of,
use specified by a deed creating a determinable fee or a fee simple subject to condition subsequent, 137 A. L. R. 639.
Validity and effect of contract or deed
which purports to cover or convey an
undivided interest in land without specifying the amount of the interest, 123 A.
L. R. 912.

57-1-13

Validity and effect ot conveyance of interest remaining in grantor upon conveyance of a fee subject to a conditional
limitation, or terminable upon breach of
a condition subsequent, 53 A. L. R. 2d 224.
Validity and effect of deed which purports to convey specified acreage or quantity of land out of larger tract, with or
without right of selection expressed, 117
A. L. R. 1071.
Validity and effect of reservation in
deed of the right to proceeds, or part of
the proceeds, of a future sale or condemnation of the property or part thereof, 123
A. L. R. 1474.
Validity, construction and effect of provisions in deed from one spouse to other
by which title was to revert in event o*
conditions affecting marital relations, 116
A. L. R. 1400.
Waiver of breach of condition subsequent in instrument conveying title to real
property, 39 A. L. R. 2d 1116.
Which of conflicting descriptions in
deeds or mortgages of extent of interest
conveyed prevails, 115 A. L. R. 192.

57-1-13. Form of quitclaim deed—Effect.—Conveyances of land may
also be substantially in the following form:
QUITCLAIM DEED
(here insert name), grantor, of
(insert place of
residence), hereby quitclaims to
(insert name), grantee, of
(here insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars,
the following described tract
of land in
County,
Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
day of
,
19
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a
conveyance of all right, title, interest and estate of the grantor in and
to the premises therein described and all rights, privileges and appurteuauces thereunto belonging, at the date of such conveyance.
History: R. a 1898 & 0. I*. 1907, § 1982;
C. L. 1917, §4882; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78*1-12.
•Xtftr-acquired title.
Quitclaim deed operates to convey estate
of grantor "at the date of such conveyftiictf," and does not convoy an aftor•*quired title. Duncan v. Hemmelwright,
\V: U. 2G2, 186 P. 2d 965.
An after-acquired title does not pass by
t quitclaim deed. Dowse v. Kammerman,
U2 U. 85, 246 P. 2d 881.
A quitclaim deed does not raise an eslui.jnjl as to an after-acquired title. Dowse
». Kammerman, 122 U. 85, 246 P. 2d 881.

Force and effect of section.
Statutory form of quitclaim deed is
permissive only, and use ot words "remise, release and quitclaim" in deed to
mining claim passed all of grantor's title.
Ruthraff v. Silver King Western Min. &
Mill. Co., 95 U. 279, 80 P. 2d 338, distinguished in 112 U. 52, 185 P. 2d 264.
Quitclaim deeds do not imply the conveyance of any particular interest in the
property. Grantee acquires only interest
of his grantor, "be that interest what it
may." Nix v. Tooele County, 101 U. 84,
118 P. 2d 376.
The fact that a grantee who had procured a quitclaim deed did nothing what-
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CHAPTER 4
MARKETING WOOL
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102)

25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed.
Repeal.
Sections 25-4-1 to 25-4-3 (L. 1931, ch.
54, §§ 1 to 4; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-4-1

to 33-4-3), relating to the marketing of
wool, were repealed by Laws 1965, ch.
154, § 10-102.

CHAPTER 5
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Section 25-5-1. Estnto or interest in real property*
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted.
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed.
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person.
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another—When not required to
be in writing.
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected.
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal.

25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.—No estate or interest in
real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any
trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner relating
thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
History: R. S. 1898 & 0. L. 1907, §§ 1974, tion governed by legislative intent. In
2461; O. L. 1917, §§4874, 5811; R. S. 1933 - re Reynolds' Estate, 90 U. 415, 62 P. 2d
& C. 1943, 33-5-1.
270.
Sale implies creation of an estate in
Compiler's Notes.
excess of a leasehold, by act of the owner.
Analogous foimer statute, Coinp. Laws
Lewis v. Dahl, 108 U. 486, 161 P. 2d 362,
1876, § 1010.
distinguished in 1 U. (2d) 354, 267 P. 2d
237.
Cross-References.
Contract for sale of goods for $500 or
Adjoining landowners,
more unenforceable in absence of some
The statute of frauds applies to adjacent
writing, 70A-2-201.
landowners, as well as to persons who are
Enforceability of security interests,
not so situated. Tripp v. Bagley, 74 U.
70A-9-203.
57, 276 P. 912, 69 A. L. R. 1417, distmStatute of frauds for contracts for sale
guished in 10 U. (2d) 370, 353 P. 2d 911.
of goods, 70A-2-201.
.
^
A
A
Statute of frauds for contracts for sale Agent s authority,
of securities, 70A-8-319.
Where, at time agreement for purchase
Statute of frauds for kinds of personal
of land was entered into, there was no
property not otherwise covered, 70A-1-206.
statute requiring agent's authority to contract for purchase of real estate to be in
Construction and application.
writing, contract would not be invalidated.
This section docs not apply unless there
Le Vine v. Wlutehouse, 37 U. 260, 109 P.
is a contract. Skeen v. Van Sickle, 80 2, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 407.
U. 419, 15 P. 2d 344.
In action for specific performance of
The meaning of the word "interest" in
contract for sale of real property, held in
this section depends on statutory construeabsence of evidence showing defendant's
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uoent was authorized in writing to sell
real property or equities taking case out
of statute of frauds, trial court properly
granted motion for dismissal of action.
Lee v. Polyhrones, 57 U. 401, 195 P. 201.
A corporation cannot be held to be tne
agent of or a trustee for a stockholder
unless this section is complied with. Geary
v. Cain, 79 U. 268, 9 P. 2d 396.
There is no requirement that the agent
of the lessee or assignee be authorized
in writing to execute the lease or assignment. Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.
2d 85.
Agreements as to liens.
Under this section, a parol agreement
imposing an additional lien upon real
uNtnto is within the statute. Jackson v.
Dallin, 47 U. 312, 152 P. 341.
Assignments.
Where several partners buy land, and
one of them thereafter assigns one-half
of his interest by oral agreement to a
third person, such assignment is not within the statute of frauds. Knauss v. Cahoon, 7 U. 182, 26 P. 295, followed in
Coffin v. Mcintosh, 9 U. 315, 34 P. 247.
Blank deeds or papers.
Blank deeds which were executed before
description had been placed thereon were
void and did not convey any interest or
title whatever. Utah State BIdg. & Loan
Assn. v. Perkins, 53 U. 474, 173 P. 950,
applying Coinp. Laws 1907, § 1974, distinguished in 14 U. (2d) 157, 380 P. 2d
(50.
Corporate officers.
This section is applicable to agents of
corporations, but the courts have adopted
an exception when the person who acts
under an oral authorization is either a
general agent or executive officer of the
corporation. In the case of an executive
officer of a corporation an exception from
the requirement of written authority is
based upon the idea that he is something
more than an agent. He is the representative of the corporation itself. Mathis
v. Madsen, 1 U. (2d) 46, 261 P. 2d 952.
Dedication of land.
Implied dedication of land for highway
is not within statute of frauds. Schettler
v. Lynch, 23 U. 305, 64 P. 955, distinguished in 52 U. 178, 169 P. 459 and 75
U. 428, 285 P. 1033.
Deeds and conveyances.
Several writings may be construed together as containing all the terms of a
contract, though only one is signed by the
party to be charged; therefore, written
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instrument containing offer to exchange
properties, but too indefinite as to terms
to satisfy statute, and signed by only one
party, may be construed with deeds subsequently executed and placed in escrow
by both parties, for purpose of establishing valid agreement within statute of
frauds, where deeds were executed before
attempted withdrawal of offer by party
who signed it. Miller v. Hancock, 67 U.
202, 246 P. 949.
Defenses to action on contract.
Under this section fraud and deceit may
constitute the gravamen of an action notwithstanding that the breach of a contract
within the statute is incidentally involved,
and the statute in such case is not a dofense. But if the gravamen of the action
is breach of an oral contract for sale of
land, it is a defense although fraud and
deceit are incidentally involved. Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 U. 404, 274 P. 856,
explained in 184 F. Supp. 231.
Easements.
Where contract seller acquiesced to the
relocation, contract purchaser and defendants' oral agreement to move easement
ditch was valid even though contract
purchaser did not complete the contract,
and even though not in writing; contract
was thereby enforceable against a subsequent purchaser from the landowner. Lyman Grazing Assn. v. Smith, 24 U. (2d)
443, 473 P. 2d 905.
Right sought by defendants to maintain
pipeline across plaintiff's land was an easement and was required to be in writing in
absence of sufficient evidence to support
finding of part performance under oral
or implied agreement. Wells v. Marcus,
25 U. (2d) 242, 480 P. 2d 129.
Oral agreement to execute easement if
a federal lease was acquired, but which
agreement was never put into writing
or executed, could not later be asserted
as an exception to the statute of frauds.
McKinnon v. Corporation of the President
of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, 529 P. 2d 434.
Gifts.
This section has been applied to parol
gift of land, where donor exercised acts
of exclusive occupancy over premises during donee's occupancy, notwithstanding
latter made improvements thereon, but
not of a substantial or permanent character. Price v. Lloyd, 43 U. 441, 135 P.
268.
Under this section an oral gift or grant
of land can only be established by evidence that is clear, convincing and unequivocal, more especially where the
alleged donor and donee are close rela-
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tions such as mother and daughter. Nor
will the mere making of improvements on
the land by alleged donee suffice to prove
a gift of the land. Boland v. Nihlros, 77
XL 205, 293 P. 7.
Grantee's name not on deed.
Where grantors sought to rescind a
transaction because the name of the grantee of the deed did not appear on the
paper at the time grantors signed it, it
was held this section required only the
signature of the grantor in order to bind
him to the transaction. Hanson v. Beehive
Security Co., 14 U. (2d) 157, 380 P. 2d 06.
"Interest In real property."
Where grnntor sought to repudiate deed
conveying land because of his incapacity
at time of execution, and grantee orally
agreed that, in consideration that grantor
would let deed stand, he would pay grantor
for life one-half of crops produced on land,
it was held that agreement was not one
for an estate or interest in land within
this section. Johnson v. Johnson, 31 XJ.
408, 88 P. 230.
Oral agreement between builder and
landowner that building should remain
personal property is not within statute,
because not involving sale of interest in
land. Workman v. llenrie, 71 U. 400, 266
P. 1033, 58 A. L. R. 1346.
Leases.
Under this section, where one executor
without authority from his coexecutors,
who were not under disability and not
absent from the state, made a lease in
writing for more than one year, the lease
was invalid. Utah Loan & Trust Co. v.
Garbutt, 6 U. 342, 23 P. 758.
Stronger cannot avail himself of requirement that lease for more than a year must
be in writing, when stranger is sued by
lessee for trespass. Livingston v. Thornl e y ^ TJ. 516, 280 P. 1042.
/ A parol lease of lands which has been
fully performed by lessor is not within
the statute. Greenwood v. Jackson, 102
U. 101, 128 P. 2d 282.
-Modifications of contract.
Agreement^jiltering or modifying ^r^ginal contract must also be in writing an_d
subscribed. Combined Metals, Inc. v. Basti'an, VI U. 535, 267 P. 1020, distinguished
in 100 U. 516, 116 P. 2d 578.
The words "as per agreement of 12-873" written on a check were not a sufficient inemorandum in writing to modify a
written contract for sale of real estate
and satisfy the statute of frauds. Zion's
Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P. 2d 1319.

Mortgages, and estates or interests of parties thereto.
Since real estate mortgagor holds title
in fee subject to mortgage lien, he has
such estate or interest in land as may be
conveyed only by written instrument under this section. Bybee v. Stuart, 112 U.
462, 189 P. 2d 118.
Nature of writing required.
Letter from partners to partnership
employee informing him that he owned
undivided 10% interest in partnership satisfied statute of frauds relating to conveyances of real property even though it
failed to mention consideration and was
otherwise not complete contract, since all
that is required under section is that
interest be granted or declared by writing
.subscribed by party to be charged. Guin;ind v. Walton, 22 U. (2d) 196, 450 P. 2d
467.
Although letters and correspondence of
parties did not precisely describe mining
claims nor terms of agreement, they constituted sufficient memorandum of agreement to meet requirements of section 3 of
statute of frauds. Peterson v. Hendricks,
524 P. 2d 321.
Option to purchase.
Where option to purchase omitted mention of oil or mineral rights, court properly admitted evidence showing that defendant had leased the oil and mineral
rights to a third party, which lease had
been ratified by the plaintiffs. Bench v.
Pace, 538 P. 2d 180.
Oral agreement on option to purchase.
Joint owner of land who had orally
agreed to, but had not signed, option to
purchase was not obligated to sell real
property, and specific performance would
not lie to compel conveyance. Eckard
v. Smith, 527 P. 2d 660.
Oral agreements as to boundaries.
Oral agreement between adjoining landowners as to location of a boundary line
is not within statute of frauds, provided,
among other things, the location of the
true boundary line sought to be thus established is or has been uncertain or in dispute. But mere fact that the person claiming title by parol agreement owns land
adjacent to the land thus sought to be conveyed cannot and does not change statute
of frauds requiring conveyance of real
estate to be in writing, without regard
to any uncertainty in location of true
boundary line. Tripp v. Bagley, 74 U.
57, 276 P. 912, 69 A. L. R. 1417, distinguished in 10 U. (2d) 370, 353 P. 2d
911.
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performance as set forth in this and two
other cases explained in 6 U. (2d) 18,
305 P. 2d 480. Instant case distinguished
in 74 U. 290, 279 P. 502; 78 XT. 502, 5 P .
2d 570 and 117 U. 483, 217 P. 2d 566.
The acts which are alleged to constitute
part performance must be in pursuance of
the oral contract which it is claimed said
performance saves from the death sentence
of the statute. In Besse v. McHenry, 89
Mont. 520, 300 P. 199, it was stated: " P a r t
performance which will avoid statute of
frauds may consist of any act which puts
party performing in such position that
nonperformance by other would constitute
Oral contracts to buy or sell land.
fraud." Utah Mercur Gold Min. Co. v.
Mrre oral agreement to purchase land
Herschel Gold Min. Co., 103 U, 249, 134
f»*»in another is within statute of frauds. P. 2d 1094.
• Udwick v. Arnold, 34 U. 48, 95 P. 527.
Doctrine of part performance to take
oral contract out of statute of frauds is
fa* ol executed agreement,
^^^^
purely equitable in nature and has no
^Miile no interest in land can be createSy place in action at law. Baugh v. Darley,
/* ***sf erred, or surrendered by merely parol
112 U. 1, 184 P. 2d 335.
• ».«-utory agreement, parol executed agreeWhore there was no memorandum re«*nt by tenant to surrender leused prem^ duced to writing or no writing subscribed
•*% uu8 not void under statute of frauds; by the parties to be charged but the de%*rutt v. llolmos, 35 U. 49, 90 j \ J £ f l - » - ^
ceased had accepted the consideration and
surrendered possession there was sufficient
r*rol partition.
part performance to avoid the statute of
}*«rtition of land among coheirs is not
frauds and the deceased's heirs and sue*
t*#47ective, at least in equity, because cessors in title and interest should not be
«*de by parol, if followed by actual pos- allowed to repudiate the contract. Such
••*»jun in severalty of parcels into which
an act would in fact constitute a fraud.
*»U was divided. Whittemore v. Cope, 11 In re Madsen's Estate, 123 U. 327, 259 P .
I . J44,40 P. 256.
2d 595.
A parol partition between joint owners
Where plaintiff moved from another city
•9 real property, when carried out and
and took care of personal and business aff»4towed by actual possession in severalty fairs of the decedent in reliance upon an
»f the several parcels, is valid and will be oral contract proved to be clear and cer«*torred notwithstanding the statute of
tain, the contract was removed from the
f»»uda. Allen v. Allen, 50 U. 104, 166 P. statute of frauds. Randall v. Tracy Col»i*tf, following Whittemore v. Cope, 11 U. lins Trust Co., 6 U. (2d) 18, 305 P. 2d
>•*, 40 P. 256.
480.
Sufficient correspondence and part perFart performance of oral contract gen- formance were reflected in record in unerally.
just enrichment action to take oral agreeWhile verbal gift or parol agreement to ment to build house for $3,000 out of
•*»vey land is within statute of frauds, statute of frauds. Jensen v. Whitesides, 13
»»<i at law a nullity, verbal agreement, U. (2d) 193, 370 P. 2d 765.
Advancement of $44,000 toward det purt performed, can, notwithstanding
•^.uiremeut of statute, be enforced by velopment of quarries was sufficient part
— art of equity. Price v. Lloyd, 31 U. 86, performance to remove oral contract from
#4 P. 767, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 870. Doctrine bar of this statute. LeGrand Johnson
*f part performance as set forth in this Corp. v. Peterson, 26 U. (2d) 158, 486 P.
• •<l two other cases explained in 6 XT. 2d 1040.
Doctrine of part performance is not
141 18, 305 P . 2d 480.
Oral contract by decedent to make will available in action at law for monetary
««viug property to plaintiff in considera- damages for breach of oral contract to
»•*« of services to be rendered, was en- convey land. McKinnon v. Corporation of
the President of the Church of Jesus
'wrmble where plaintiff rendered such
••rxices as he was called upon to perform Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 529 P. 2d
*»U*r contract up to time of death of de- 434.
4«*4<»d, and during which time he was in
#.«*M»»*ion of property by arrangement —improvements and other expenditures.
«**•!« by deceased. Van N a t t a v. Heywood,
In action to enforce parol gift of land
; : l \ 376, 195 P. 192. Doctrine of part
on theory of part performance, evidence
If adjoining landowners acquiesce in
• division line other than true line, with
••««ledge of location of true line and
• »ih design and purpose of thereby transl a t i n g a tract of land from one to the
•4Vcr, such acquiescence alone will not
•f^rate us a conveyance. Land cannot be
«»*v«»yed from one person to another by
m*r*lv changing possession, even though
MMh change in possession continues for a
«*•*» period of time. Tripp v. Bagley, 74
I* S7, 276 P. 912, 69 A. L. R. 1417, dis'.•t'uitfhed in 10 U. (2d) 370, 353 P. 2d
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showed improvements were not of such
value or character as to take case out of
operation of statute. Price v. Lloyd, 31
U. 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 870.
Doctrine of part performance as set forth
in this and two other cases explained in
6 U. (2d) 18, 305 P. 2d 480.
In action to quiet title, defended on
ground that defendant had entered into
oral contract to purchase property, and
had gone into possession, making of small
improvements by defendant held insufficient to take case out of statute of frauds.
Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 U. 575, 206 P.
262, 33 A. L. R. 1481.
In quiet title action in which defense
was that defendant was in possession
pursuant to parol gift, evidence that defendant made expenditures upon real
estate was not sufficient to take case out
of statute of frauds, even had defendant
definitely proven promise to give her the
property, where value of defendant's free
use of the property exceeded amount allegedly spent for improvements. Moffat v.
Hoffman, 61 U. 482, 214 P. 308.
In action for specific performance of
oral agreement to convey east half of certain parcel of land which was made after
written agreement in which plaintiff was
to have undivided one-half interest, evidence that land was definitely described,
that plaintiff entered on part of east half
in reliance upon parol agreement and actually occupied a substantial portion
thereof, and made permanent and valuable
improvements thereon, all with knowledge
and consent of vendors, and that plaintiff
paid full purchase price, was sufficient evidence of part performance to take oral
agreement out of operation of statute of
frauds. Hogan v. Swayze, 65 XL 380, 237
P. 1097, distinguished in 67 U. 202, 246
P. 949.
—part payment of purchase money.
A parol transfer of land, with part payment of the purchase money, no possession
passing under the contract, is invalid. The
fact that a part of the purchase money
had been paid was not of itself sufficient
in equity to take the parol contract out of
the statute. Maxfield v. West, 6 U. 327,
23 P. 754.
Pleading.
If statute of frauds is relied upon it
mubt be pleaded. Skeen v. Van Sickle, 71
U. 577, 268 P. 562.
By the weight of authority when a complaint shows that the contract relied on
was oral and within the statute of frauds,
but the facts alleged are not sufficient to
take it out of the statute, a demurrer lies
on the ground that the complaint does not
state sufficient facts. In this way the de-

fense of the statute may be raised by demurrer. Utah Mercur Gold Min. Co. v.
llerschel Gold Min. Co., 103 U« 249, 134
P. 2d 1094.
Recovery of money paid tinder parol contract
Money paid under parol contract for sale
of land may be recovered unless vendor
makes offer in apt time to perform contract. Bacon v. McChrystal, 10 U. 290, 37
P. 563.
Where defendant verbally agreed with
owner of real estate which was subject
to mortgage to bid the property in at
foreclosure sale, and to convey title to
plaintiff for certain sum after he obtained
sheriff's deed, and plaintiff relied on such
agreement and paid specified amount to
defendant who asserted ownership to property and refused to convey, held trust ex
maleficio arose, and was enforceable
though contract was not in writing. Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 U. 48, 95 P. 527.
Release, discharge and surrender.
Surrender of interest under contract for
purchase of land could be properly effected
without deed or conveyance in writing in
compliance with statute. Budge v. Barron,
51 U. 234, 169 P. 745.
Mortgagor's oral surrender of his interest in the land to mortgagee is within this
section, so as to be unenforceable. Bybee
v. Stuart, 112 U. 462, 189 P. 2d 118.
Rescission or abandonment of c o n t r a c t
Where right of purchaser under contract
for sale of land was subject to forfeiture
upon failure or refusal to make payments
or to comply with terms of contract, he
could, with consent of vendor, rescind contract and abandon all of his rights under
it; and if this is done by any acts or conduct which clearly manifest an intention
to rescind or abandon contract by both
vendor and vendee, and vendor takes possession in pursuance of parol agreement,
then rescission is complete and binding
on both parties. Cutright v. Union Sav.
& Inv. Co., 33 U. 486, 94 P. 984, 14 Ann.
Cas. 725.
Executory contract with respect to real
property may not be rescinded nor discharged, unless by act or operation of law,
where neither party is in default without
some form of written agreement entered
into between contracting parties; but
where there is breach or abandonment of
contract by cither party, the rule is otherwise. Thackeray v. Knight, 57 U. 21, 192
P. 263.
Restrictive covenants.
Land which was included in unsuccessful petition for rezoning was not bound by
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Equity will not enforce mere voluntary
agreement or mere parol gift of land.
Price v. Lloyd, 31 U. 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L. E.
A. (N. 8.) 870.
In action to quiet title, defended on
ground that defendant had entered into
oral contract to purchase property, held,
it was not only incumbent upon defendant
ifuclflc performance.
to prove certain, definite, and unambigu*+* far as donee's right to specific per- ous contract for purchase of property, but
t^m^iwe of gift of certain land by de- also such acts in part performance thereof
as in equity are considered sufficient to
**••*•«! was concerned, held that, although
««*4 letter from deceased, as remembered take case out of statute of frauds. Hargreavos v. Burton, 59 U. 575, 206 P. 262,
%» witnesses, did not contain description
*t ,4tid in dispute, or refer to it with 33 A. L. E. 1481.
An action to collect money due under a
*»**»n.iMe certainty, witnesses' testimony,
»***n in connection with letter, indicated parol lease is not an action in specific performance.
Greenwood v. Jackson, 102 U.
•A~kt land ill controversy was intended, and
161, 128 P. 2d 282.
*i^t, notwithstanding fact that letter was
•*»t numciently definite and certain as writPlaintiffs who had made a down pay*4 to take transaction out of statute, it
ment, had completed mortgage payments,
and
had paid special curb and gutter as• »• duty of court to consider lettor with
sessment pursuant to oral contract for
.**« evidence and determine from both
purchase of realty were entitled to specific
«*.ther parol promise to give land in
*«ri lo donee was sufficiently expressed. performance. Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P. 2d
1035.
**r*e v. Smith, 14 U. 35, 45 P. 1006.
i «urt of equity will not decree specific
Tenancy at will.
jaffurmunce of parol agreement or gift of
«**4 where contract lacks certainty and
A contract by a tenant at will to sell
«**|il<>tt'ness and when not founded upon and surrender his possession of a hotel,
«*4u<tble consideration. Price v. Lloyd, together with the personal property used
U T. SO, 86 P. 767, 8 L. E. A. (N. S.) 870. in connection therewith, is not within this
la action to have decreed specific persection of the statute of frauds. Eeno v.
f.-finkiico of parol agreement for gift of
Beardsley, 6 U. 208, 21 P. 944, applying 2
«**4, wherein plaintiff relied on contract Comp. Laws 1888, § 2831.
*# promise of deceased to convey land in
n**wd»«rntion of services rendered by plain- Trusts.
f f. evidence held insufficient to support
Where attorney who was heir was em•«-4«tfti«.-tit of parol gift. Price v. Lloyd, ployed by executor to purchase another
W V. 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L. B. A. (N. S.) 870. heir's interest in decedent's estate, but,
It IH essential that parol agreement or after making purchase in his own name
i*f\ nhould be established by clear, unon representation to vending heir, who
««t*iiu«*al and definite testimony, and acts was unwilling to sell to anyone except
• wA.med to be done thereunder, should be another heir, that he was purchasing for
•*t«*lly clear and definite and referable executor, refused to convey to executor,
• «/iusively to contract or gift. Price v. notwithstanding latter tendered both purU,»J. 31 U. 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L. B. A. (N. chase price and also ample compensation
A / »70.
for attorney's services, held that attorney's
conduct created, by operation of law,
la proceeding to enforce parol gift of
«tAd on theory of part performance, acts trust in favor of executor, within meaning
4»*»f prior to contract, since they are of this section and 25-5-2. Haight v.
Pearson, 11 U. 51, 39 P. 479.
«**ih«»r in pursuance nor in execution of
Where property was paid for with money
i. are never part performance upon which
»«• ba»e specific performance of agreement of husband, and title thereto was taken
*»• roiirt of equity. Price v. Lloyd, 31 U.
in name of wife, resulting trust arose, to
*k no P. 767, 8 L. E. A. (N. S.) 870.
which statute of frauds did not apply.
Anderson v. Cercone, 54 U. 345, 180 P. 586.
In proceeding to enforce parol gift of
»*d on theory of part performance, mak**^ vt valuable, or substantial, or bene- —evidence admissible to establish trust.
Parol evidence is admissible to show a
**w*i improvements by donee in possession,
trust relationship by operation of law.
'» doing of other analogous acts which
«*M*M render revocation and refusal to Barrett v. Vickers, 100 U. 534, 116 P. 2d
>i«plete inequitable, is essential to en- 772.
'crriiuMit of parol gift of land. Price v.
In action to impress trust upon real
u**.l. 31 U. 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L. E. A. (N. property, evidence supported finding that
grantor's daughter took property by war* , »;o.

*«!firti\o covenants executed in conuec*»*m with later successful petition, where
-**4 although rezoned, had not been in•»*4»«1 in later petition and owner had
•*** tigned petition or document of restrie• *t covenants. Gunnell v. Hurst Lbr. Co.,
ki l \ ^Jd) 209, 515 P. 2d 1274.
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ranty deed subject to "oral trust" whereby daughter was to maintain property as
family home to be used by grantor, and
her children and grandchildren, for as
long as any of said persons needed a home,
with complete discretion in daughter as
to the time and as to which of said persons
should use property. Haws v. Jensen, 116
U. 212, 209 P. 2d 229, distinguished in 12
U. (2d) 328, 366 P. 2d 594.

Check or note as memorandum satisfying
statute of frauds, 153 A. L. R. 1112.
Conflict of laws: comment note on
statute of frauds and conflict of laws, 47
A. L. R. 3d 137.
Consideration: necessity and sufficiency
of statement of consideration in contract
or memorandum of sale of land, under
statute of frauds, 23 A. L. R. 2d 164.
Description or designation of land in
contract or memorandum of sale, under
statute of frauds, 23 A. L. R. 2d 6.
—parol partition.
Erasure: effect of attempted cancellaResulting trust in real property will not
be changed into express trust, and parol tion or erasure in memorandum otherwise
division of property thus be rendered in- sufficient to satisfy statute of frauds, 31
valid, by mere fact that, after resulting A. L. R. 2d 1112.
Extinguishment or modification of easetrust has been created by law, trustee
ment by parol agreement, 71 A. L. R. 1370.
executes written declaration of trust which
Extrinsic writing referred to in written
is not recorded and becomes no part of
record title to property. Rogers v. Don- agreement as part thereof for purposes
of statute of frauds, 73 A. L. R. 1383.
nellan, 11 U. 108, 39 P. 494.
Failure to object to parol evidence or
voluntary introduction thereof, as waiver,
Wills.
15 A. L. R. 2d 1330.
Where will is sought to be maintained
Initials as sufficient signature under
also as a contract, it must satisfy this
statute of frauds, 159 A. L. R. 253.
and succeeding sections of the statute of
Installation of fixtures as part performfrauds. Ward v. Ward, 90 U. 203, 85 P.
ance which will take parol lease out of
2d 035.
statute of frauds, 10 A. L. R. 1495.
Joint adventure agreement for acquisiCollateral References.
tion, development, or sale of land as within
Frauds, Statute of<3»63(l).
provision of statute of frauds governing
37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of § 69.
broker's agreement for commission on
49 Am. Jur. 488 et seq., Statute of
real estate sale, 48 A. L. R. 2d 1042.
Frauds § 149 et seq.
Joint adventure or partnership to deal
in real estate as affected by statute, 18
A. L. R. 485, 95 A. L. R. 1242.
Acceptance: oral acceptance of written
Judicial sale: statute of frauds as afoffer by party sought to be charged as
satisfying statute of frauds, 30 A. L. R. fecting enforceability as between the parties of agreement to purchase property at
2d 972.
Agent of one party, or party himself, as judicial or tax sale for their joint benefit,
14 A. L. R. 2d 1294.
the agent of the other party for the purManner of pleading statute of frauds as
pose of signing contract or memorandum
defense, 158 A. L. R. 89.
as required by the statute of frauds, 47
A. L. R. 201.
Memorandum which will satisfy statute
of frauds, as predicable in whole or part
Agent's authority required to be in writupon writings prior to the oral agreement,
ing as applicable to corporate officers and
1 A. L. R. 2d 841.
employees, 1 A. L. R. 1132.
Minerals: solid mineral royalty as real
Agreement to forego or delay exercise of
right to foreclose or take possession under or personal property for purposes of statmortgage, or extend time of payment as ute of frauds, 68 A. L. R. 2d 734.
Modification of sealed instrument by
within statute of frauds, 97 A. L. R. 793.
subsequent parol agreement, 55 A. L. R.
Agreement to release, discharge, or assign real estate mortgage as within stat- 685.
^^Qpfion in lease for extension of term or
ute of frauds, 32 A. L. R. 874.
Agreement with subpurchaser of realty /for a new lease as affecting applicability
of provision of statute of frauds, 161 A.
as affected by statute, 38 A. L. R. 1348.
Applicability of statute of frauds to con\ ^44*^1094.
Option to purchase property as within
tracts to surrender, rescind, or abandon
statute of frauds in relation to real proptrusts, 173 A. L. R. 281.
Boundary line established by oral agree- erty, 61 A. L. R. 1454.
Oral agreement restricting use of real
ment or acquiescence, 69 A. L. R. 1430,
property as within the statute of frauds,
113 A. L. R. 421.
Brokerage or agency contract concern- ^ A . L. R. 2d 1316.
ing real property as within statute of /^"tHtrPsurrender of written lease, 78 A.
frauds, 151 A. L. R. 048.
Ih. R. 2d 933.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Parol evidence rule as applied to rights
vr liabilities of eopartieH to contract as
Urtween themselves or their privies, 129
A. L. R. 673.
Parol gift of realty, 155 A. L. R. 76.
/Parol lease for term of a year to commence in future us within statute of
V^WMHIS, 111 A. I,. R.

1465.

Parol partition and the statute of
frauds, 133 A. L. R. 476.
Partnership: statute of frauds as affect.ng question when real estate owned by
,..*rtnor before formation of partnership
*dl be deemed to have become asset of
*rm, 43 A. L. U. 2d 1015,
Part performance of oral contract to
euiwvy being predicated upon possession
«r improvement by one spouse of real property of other, 74 A. L. R. 218.
Part performance to take oral contract
uf lease out of statute of frauds predicated
upon acts or conduct of one in possession
ut the property under another contract or
ritfht, 125 A. L. R. 14G8.
Price fixed in contract violating statute
of frauds as evidence of value in action
on quantum meruit, 21 A. L. R. 3d 9.
Principal's or authorized agent's name,
,n body of instrument, as satisfying statute of frauds where transaction was not
conducted by him, 28 A, L. R. 1114.
Printed, stamped, or typewritten name
A* satisfying requirement of statute of
frauds as regards signature, 171 A. L. R.
134.
Promissory estoppel, 48 A. L. R. 2d
1079.
Rescission: applicability of statute of
frauds to agreement to rescind contract
for sale of land, 42 A. L. R. 3d 242.
Restrictions on use of real property by
«ral agreement, 5 A. L. R. 2d 1316.
Rights of parties under oral agreement
to buy or bid in land for another, 42
A. L. R. 10, 135 A. L. R. 232, 27 A. L. R.
Jd 1285.
Right to maintain action for damages as
for breach of contract upon lease defectively executed, 82 A. L. R. 1318.

25-5-2

Right to reformation of deed or mortgage so as to enlarge or restrict the land
or interest covered as affected by statute,
86 A. L. R. 448.
Signatures: admissibility of parol evidence to connect signed and unsigned
documents relied upon as memorandum to
satisfy statute of frauds, 81 A. L. R. 2d
991.
Signature with lead pencil, 8 A. L. R.
1339.
Statute of frauds and conflict of laws,
161 A. L. R. 820.
Sufficiency of description or designation
of land in contract or memorandum of
sale, under statute of frauds, 23 A. L. R.
2d 6.
Sufficiency, under the statute of frauds,
of description or designation of land in
contract or memorandum of sale which
gives right to select the tract to be conveyed, 46 A. L. R. 2d 894.
Timber: standing timber, sale or contract for sale of, as within provisions of
statute of frauds respecting sale or contract of sale of real property, 7 A. L. R.
2d 517.
Undelivered deed or escrow, pursuant to
oral contract, as satisfying statute of
frauds, 100 A. L. R. 196.
Validity and effect of oral agreement in
alternative, one of the alternatives being
within the statute of frauds, 13 A. L.
R. 271.
Waiver by parol of provision in sealed
instrument, 55 A. L. R. 700.
What constitutes a contract in writing
within statute of limitations, 3 A. L. R.
2d 809.
Who must sign and form of signature,
in caBo of partnership, in order to comply
with statute of frauds, 114 A. L. R. 1005.
Law Reviews.
Boyce, The Uniform Commercial Code
in Utah, B. Statute of Frauds, 9 Utah L.
Rev. 910.
Note: An Appraisal of the Utah Statute
of Frauds, 9 Utah L. Rev. 978.

25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted.—The next preceding section
; 25-5-1] shall not be construed to affect the power of a testator in the
disposition of his real estate by last will and testament; nor to prevent any
trust from arising or being extinguished by implication or operation of
law.
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 2462;
C. L. 1917, §5812; E. S. 1933 * O. 1943,
i*-6-2.
Compiler's Notes
, ,
'
. A A
,
Analogous former statutes, Comp. Laws
1-70, §1011; 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §2832.

Trusts.
Trusts arising by implication or operation of law are expressly excluded from
the effocts of t h e
statute; and a deed of
conveyance, though absolute in form, if
given to secure a debt, is in eouitv treated
as a mortgage-* t r u s t b y TpZuon
ot
law. Wasatch Min. Co. v. Jennings. 5 U
243, 15 P. 65.
*
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FRAUD

Where one, having no interest in real
estate, orally agrees with another that latter should purchase it with his own funds
and take title in his own name, and that
he should thereafter convey it to former
upon an agreed price, no resulting or constructive trust arises, and such contract is
within statute of frauds. Chadwick v.
Arnold, 34 U. 48, 95 P. 527.
Trust ex maleficio arises whenever person acquires legal title to property of
another by means of intentional false or
fraudulent verbal promise to hold same for
certain purpose, and, having thus obtained
title, retains and claims property as his
own. Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 U. 48, 95 P.
527.
Where defendant verbally agreed with
owner of real estate which was subject to
mortgage to bid the property in at foreclosure sale, and to convey title to plaintiff
for certain sum after he obtained sheriff's
deed, and plaintiff relied on such agreement and paid specified amount to defendant who asserted ownership to property
nnd refused to convey, held trust ex maleficio arose, and was enforceable though
contract was not in writing. Chadwick v.
Arnold, 34 U. 48, 95 P . 527.
One seeking to have rights declared and
enforced, founded upon or growing out of
trust or confidential relation, is required
to show, with at least reasonable certainty, the terms of agreement and character and extent of trust or confidential
relation. Coray v. Holbrook, 40 U. 325,
121 P. 572. See also 25-5-1.
Equity imposes a constructive trust to
prevent one from unjustly
profiting
through fraud or the violation of a duty
imposed under a fiduciary or confidential
relationship. Hawkins v. Perry, 123 U. 16,
253 P. 2d 372.
Where defendant altered a certificate
of sale of land by inserting his own name
as purchaser and the land was not in-

cluded in the decedent's estate which was
distributed in 1924, there was a constructive trust for the benefit of the decedent's
heirs and the estate could be reopened.
Perry v. McConkie, 1 U. (2d) 189, 264 P .
2d 852.
A deed given to secure a debt, though
absolute in form, was in equity a mortgage, so that a trust was created by operation of law and, under the express language of this section, was not prevented by
25-5-1. Taylor v. Turner, 27 U. (2d) 39,
492 P. 2d 1343.
Wills.
When will is sought
also as a contract, it
and succeeding sections
frauds. Ward v. Ward,
2d 635.

to be maintained
must satisfy this
of the statute of
96 U. 263, 85 P .

Collateral References.
Frauds, Statute of<S»63(l).
37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of § 69.
Applicability of statute of frauds to
contracts to surrender, rescind or abandon
trusts, 106 A. L. R. 1313, 173 A. L. R.
281.
Character and validity of instrument as
contract as affected by provision for postmortem payment or performance, 1 A. L.
R. 2d 1178.
Decedent's agreement to devise, bequeath, or leave property as compensation
for services, 106 A. L. R. 742.
Enforceability, as regards proceeds of
sale of property, of real estate trust that
does not satisfy statute of frauds, 154 A.
L. R. 385.
Grantee's oral promise to grantor as giving rise to trust, 159 A. L. R. 997.
Trust arising by grantee's oral promise
to grantor, 35 A. L. R. 280, 45 A. L. R.
851, 80 A. L. R. 195, 129 A. L. R. 689, 159
A. L. R. 997.

25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands.—Every contract for
the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands,
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some nol£_or
memorandum thereof, is in writing finWrihp^ tyy frhe party by whom the
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized
History: R. S. 1898 & O. L. 1907, § 2463;
0. L. 1917, §5813; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
33-5-3.
Compiler's Notes.
Analogous former statute, 2 Comp. Laws
1888, §3918 (5).
Adjudicated forms.
Form of contract for sale and purchase

of land, see Talbot v. Anderson, 80 U.
436, 15 P. 2d 350.
Agent's authority.
In action for specific performance of
contract for sale of real property, held in
absence of evidence showing defendant's
agent was authorized in writing to sell
real property or equities taking case out
of statute of frauds, trial court properly
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